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Introduction 
1 Nigeria has a large concentration of children who are not attending school despite a
decade of investment in a programme of mass education, the Universal Basic Education
(UBE), launched in September 1999. The Federal Ministry of Education (FME 2009) admits
that 10.5 million children (or 30% of the primary school-age cohort) do not have access to
primary education, but this figure masks widespread disparities between the nation’s six
geopolitical  zones.  For  instance,  in  the  North-East  and North-West  zones,  commonly
referred to as the ‘core north’, over 50% of the children do not attend school compared
with less than 20% in the South-East and South-South (National Population Commission,
NPC, & IFC Macro 2009). The core north has a predominantly Muslim population and its
long history of contact with Islam shaped its socio-economic and political framework
long  before  colonisation  by  the  British.  Therefore,  the  introduction  of  Christianity,
western  education  and  colonial  state  structures  by  missionaries  and  colonialists
threatened an established social  order that derived legitimacy from its  linkages with
Islam. The public school system, erected by the colonial state and sustained by the post-
colonial elite, had to contend with a persistent religious parallel in the form of Islamic
schools. A continuous concern in the discourse on education in Northern Nigeria has been
how  to  mitigate  the  influence  of  these  schools  on  popular  participation  in  state-
sponsored education programmes. 
2 By exploring their past interactions with pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial state
structures  in Nigeria,  this  discourse seeks  to  establish that  little  has  changed in the
essential character of Islamic schools as a loose network of schools under the direction of
Islamic Schools, the Ulama, and the State in the Educational Development of N...
Bulletin de l'APAD, 33 | 2012
1
their individual patrons. This has given the schools a certain degree of fluidity that makes
their interactions with Nigeria’s public education difficult, and limits their contributions
to the policy goal of universal access to education. It has also conferred on individual
members of the ulama1 the unregulated power to define the intellectual direction of the
schools they own and the scope of their interaction with the state. The paper examines
three variants of Islamic schools (Islamiyya, Madrassa and Traditional Qur’anic Schools)
that have evolved among Hausa people in the core north.  The aim is  to analyse the
complex  pattern  of  co-operation,  competition  and  avoidance  that  characterises  the
relationship between the ulama and the state in the educational arena.2
 
The State, Ulama and Education in Nigeria 
3 The  most  distinctive  feature  that  defines  the ulama is  their  expertise  in,  and
preoccupation with,  religious,  educational  and legal  affairs  that  constitute  the  broad
ideological parameters of Islamic societies (Umar 2006). Historically, being a member of
the ulama establishment entailed full-time engagement with matters of scholarship and
piety (learning,  teaching and preaching)  that  left  little  or  no time for generating an
income. The lack of regular income therefore made the ulama reliant on the goodwill and
support of the Muslim community or an influential patron. Assurance of this support
appears to have been a necessary condition for the development of the ulama class in
Hausa communities in pre-colonial Northern Nigeria (Balogun 1980). Therefore, when a
Muslim cleric  arrived in an area,  a  mutually  beneficial  alliance was  naturally  struck
between him and the ruling elite leading to the gradual integration of the ulama into the
ruling elite in these areas. In return for the necessary permission, material comforts and
assurances of personal safety and protection from their benefactors, the ulama deployed
their mystic power, literacy skills and religious and judicial knowledge in the service of
the  state  or  influential  members  of  the  political  establishment  (Balogun  1980).  This
symbiosis between the ulama and the political class gave Islam and Islamic education the
necessary footholds in Northern Nigerian cities  and towns that  subsequently became
well-known for  Islamic  scholarship  at  different  times.  Scholars  like  Muhammadu Al-
Maghili were known to have laid the framework for the establishment of Islamic legal and
administrative systems in Kano and Katsina through their alliances with the political
leadership  in  these  areas  (Clarke  1982).  In  Katsina,  Al-Maghili  also  established  an
institution of learning at Gobarau that became a prominent centre of Islamic learning
(Bugaje 1997). There were, however, less-celebrated instances of the ulama that blended
into the political  reality of the Hausa states by condoning the mixture of Islam with
prevailing un-Islamic local customs and traditions. Irrespective of the roles they played,
the point of emphasis is that, by the 18th century, the ulama had occupied positions of
authority in the local politicl structures that enabled them to influence state policy and
programmes. 
4 However, the linkages the ulama developed with the political class did not succeed in
placing education on the development agenda of the state (Khalid 1999). Therefore while
some Islamic influence could be felt in the legal and administrative structures of some
Hausa states (even if  only nominally),  education still  remained on the fringe of state
policy. The main reason for this may have been little demand for education among the
populace. By the 18th century, there were strong allegiances with traditional religions
among the local populace in Hausa states, even in political enclaves headed by Muslim
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rulers. For instance, the Kings of Kano and Katsina, although Muslim themselves, ruled
over territories where the population was largely non-Muslim (Clarke 1982). As a result,
governance structures in these states had to be a compromise between traditional religio-
political systems and Islamic governmental principles and practice. Another reason for
the failure to evolve a state policy on education may have been political instability. The
frequent  in-fighting  that  characterised  relationships  between  the  Hausa  states  of
Zamfara, Gobir, Katsina, Kano, and Kebbi for much of the 18th century meant that none of
them enjoyed the lasting tranquillity needed to pay serious attention to education.  
5 It was therefore left to the ulama in their role as scholars, teachers, and preachers to
spread Islamic education beyond the confines of rulers’ courts and the cities to various
locations in the Hausa states. By the beginning of the 19th century, Islamic education had
spread and developed clear patterns and well-established curricula through the efforts of
individual members of the ulama (Abdulrahman & Canham 1978). This not only increased
the number of Islamic adherents among the masses but also led to the growth of ulama
within the ranks that had no linkages with the political class. In choosing to distance
themselves from power and corruption, these scholars were following in the tradition of
the ulama’ul sunna (righteous scholars) who were widely respected as beacons of justice,
humility and courage (Bugaje 1997). The ulamaúl sunna tended to be more vocal in their
attacks on non-Islamic customs and traditions that were hitherto condoned by the ulama
of  the  royal  courts  (Balogun  1980).  These  criticisms  provoked  tension  between  the
ulamaúl sunna and those ulama (called ulamaúl su’ or venal scholars) who served in and
sustained governments of unjust Muslim rulers contrary to the provision of the Sharia.
Thus by turning against the state (instead of merely coexisting with it), ulamaúl sunna and
their disciples created for themselves new spheres of religious authority beyond the royal
courts.
6  The account above suggests that the ulama are not a monolithic body. They have been
historically divided on various points of religious belief, practice and politics. But it is
their involvement with the ruling elite that appears to have polarised them into opposing
political orientations (Umar 2006). According to two prominent ideological torch bearers
of  the ulamaúl  sunna (Al-Maghili  and Sheikh Usman Danfodio),  before a  malam could
undertake  the  functions  of  the  ulama,  he  requires  a  thorough understanding  of  the
writings  of  respected  orthodox  scholars.  He  also  needs  independence  of  thought
unencumbered by any materialism or allegiance to a  political  authority.   By aligning
themselves  to political  power,  the ulamaúl  su’ were considered to have compromised
these vital scholarly credentials. Sharing in the discredit of ulama’ul su’ were the lesser or
pseudo scholars (Gardawa) who, on account of their limited learning, are technically not
members of the ulama. However, despite their limited learning, Gardawa perform all the
functions of the ulama outlined above, including establishing schools and preaching in
rural areas beyond the scrutiny of more established scholars (Clarke 1982). Attacks on the
activities of these scholars and teachers were to form part of the basis of the Danfodiyo-
led Jihad at the beginning of the 19th century. 
7 An ulama-led Jihad (Sokoto Jihad of 1804) was the outcome of the stand-off between the
ulamaúl sunna and the ruling elite (including their advisers from the ulama class) that
sought to cleanse Islam of customs and traditions considered un-Islamic. The successful
execution of this Jihad led to the founding of an Islamic empire (the Sokoto Caliphate)
that eventually displaced the traditional ruling elite from positions of power and reduced
the political influence of the ulamaúl su.  By placing them in positions of political power,
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the  Jihad  provided  the  ulamaúl  sunna (the  erstwhile  opponents  of  ulama-state
engagements), the instrument of state to translate their religious agenda into concrete
programmes. It is worth remembering that while the ulama made an immense individual
contribution to the growth of Islamic education, bringing the machinery of state to the
side of education eluded them for too long. 
8 Unfortunately,  even the Jihad did not change this pattern because education did not
feature prominently as a state programme even after the establishment of the caliphate
(Ardo & Junaid 1990).  While in their individual roles as scholars,  leaders of the Jihad
strengthened the existing pattern of Islamic education by producing a large collection of
books and poems, there is little evidence to suggest a deliberate effort by the state to take
over education and implement a programme (Abdulrahman & Canham 1978). Although
one may be tempted to attribute this to a lack of a centralised control over the caliphate’s
confederate states, the existence of an administrative structure of 21 departments at the
centre weakens this argument. The central government may not have had direct control
over the more than 36 emirates in the caliphate, but it served to be an administrative
model from which the emirates copied. However of the 21 departments established by the
caliphate for state administration,  none was in charge of education.3 As a result,  the
model  of  education  established  since  the  14th century  based  on  the  study  of
jurisprudence,  theology,  mysticism,  grammar,  rhetoric  and exegesis  remained largely
unchanged long after the establishment of the caliphate, and even to the present day
(Ardo & Junaid 1990). By the beginning of the 20th century when the British colonialists
conquered and established their suzerainty over the caliphate,  Islamic education was
very much alive in the hands of the ulama. However, the system was dealt a heavy blow
even before the formal commencement of colonialism due to the death or dispersal of a
large  number  of  ulama in  the  military  campaigns  that  characterised  British  colonial
conquest of the Sokoto caliphate (Khalid 1997). In addition, by introducing an alternative
education and making its acquisition the sole criterion for entry into privileged positions,
the ‘new’ colonial order undermined the monopoly of the Ulama over literacy and access
to positions,  resources and prestige (Umar 2001).  Overwhelmed but not dead,  Islamic
schools persisted as parallels to the growing dominance of western education. Lacking
any  cohesive  response  to  the  onslaught  of  western  education  and  modernity,  these
schools  maintained an exclusive  focus  on other-worldly  aspects  of  Islamic  education
described  earlier  (Bano  2009).  Even  though  Islamic  schools  continued  to  have  large
patronage among the populace, they remained without supervision or support from the
state  because  the  British  colonial  authorities  failed  to  develop  a  coherent  policy  of
engaging with them or their owners.  Instead, the attitude of the colonialists towards
these schools were characterised by ambivalence, and neglect (Abdulrahman & Canham
1978; Ozigi & Ocho 1981). Therefore, while the ulama lost linkages with the state, their
control  over  curricula  contents,  instructional  practices  and  management  of  Islamic
schools  remained as  it  had always  been in  the  pre-colonial  period:  uncontested and
unchecked.
9 The  post-colonial  state  that  emerged  after  Nigeria’s  independence  in  1960  made
concerted  efforts  to  expand  western  education  as  a  strategy  for  confronting  the
development challenges facing an emerging nation-state. The Northern Region, which
comprised  states  in  present-day  Northern  Nigeria,  had  the  largest  concentration  of
Islamic schools but was lagging behind the other regions in terms of ‘official’ educational
development.  For instance,  at  independence,  Northern Nigeria (with over half  of  the
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country’s population) accounted for less than 10% of primary-school enrolment and less
than 5% at secondary-school level (Dudley 1968). The spate of educational expansion that
the region witnessed in response to this educational imbalance proceeded on a similar
pattern  of  limited  engagement  with  Islamic  schools  followed  by  their  complete
abandonment  by  the  state  in  subsequent  years.  Using  his  charismatic  influence  and
control over state resources, the Premier of the Northern Region, the late Sir Ahmadu
Bello,  initiated plans  to  put  in place a  programme for  the gradual  reform and state
support of local Islamic institutions (Khalid 1997; Odumosu, Olaniyi & Alonge 2009). The
impact of this policy thrust was the provision of state support to those Islamic schools
willing to modernise, as well as the establishment of a limited number of state schools
meant for the training of teachers that would cover the Arabic language and Islamic
education components on the curricula of formal schools. However, the assassination of
the Premier in 1966 led to a reduced tempo in the implementation of these programmes
and robbed Islamic schools of a strong pillar of support within the state bureaucracy.
Moreover, the dismantling of regional administrative structures across the country and
their replacement with smaller semi-autonomous administrative units or states, which
began in 1967,4 made it  harder for  states  in Northern Nigeria  to develop a  common
regional response to a problem that is peculiar to them. The prolonged absence of a
common policy framework for dealing with Islamic schools facilitated the continuation of
ambivalent  relationships and  occasional  engagements,  mutual  isolation  and  neglect
between the various state governments in Northern Nigeria and Islamic schools  that
dates back to the colonial era. While the devastating consequences of this isolation and
neglect  on  Islamic  schools,  their  pupils  and  owners  became  obvious,  the  long-term
implications of these developments on the stability of the Nigerian state took longer to
manifest themselves. 
 
State-Sponsored Education, Failed Promises and the
Resurgence of Nigerian Madrassas
10 The 1970s were characterised by a flurry of development activities in Nigeria, motivated
by increased revenue and the demands of post-war reconstruction after the termination
of  the  country’s  civil  war  in  1970.  One  of  the  most  significant  developments  in  the
education sector was the promulgation of a new National Policy on Education (NPE) in
1977 following the recommendations of a national curriculum conference held in 1969.
The NPE had been preceded in 1976 by the launch of an ambitious programme of mass
education, the Universal Primary Education (UPE) programme, aimed at providing free
and universal access to primary education to all school-aged children (Taiwo 1980). The
Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN),  according to Taiwo, introduced UPE, convinced
that  only  a  programme  of  such  a  scale  could  address  the  problem  of  educational
imbalance between the north and the south of the country. In addition, it was also hoped
that the UPE would facilitate the realisation of the vision of a new Nigeria.
11 Emboldened  by  an  attractive  revenue  profile  due  to  a  sudden  rise  in  the  price  of
petroleum in 1973, the FGN took on the responsibility of providing all the funds for the
implementation of the UPE, while state governments would act as implementing agents
(Taiwo 1980). Prior to the implementation of the UPE, the FGN had assumed exclusive
responsibility for the provision and funding of all aspects of higher education in 1972
(Taiwo 1980). It also took over the management of all missionary and private schools to
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meet the public’s increasing demand for education (Umar 2003). Consequently, budgetary
allocation for  education rose  from N282m in  the  Second National  Development  Plan
(1970-1974)  to  N3.1bn  in  the  Third  NDP  (1975-1980)  (Umar  2003).  These  measures,
according  to  Umar,  represented  the  expansion  of  the  developmental  state  in  the
education arena. In the first year alone, school enrolments in many states went beyond
official projections (Taiwo 1980). Even in the Muslim-majority states of Northern Nigeria
(such  as  Kano  and  Sokoto)  known  for  their  apathy  to  western  education,  school
enrolments  rose  significantly  (Khalid  1997)  but  were  still  below  official  projections
(Aiyepeku 1989). According to Umar (2003), the growing prosperity of the oil-boom years
and the prospects of tangible material rewards for acquiring western education helped to
neutralise Muslims’ hostility towards it. 
12 The overwhelming success of the UPE in terms of the quantitative expansion of school
enrolment was to be its undoing.  Large pupil enrolments placed a heavy toll on teachers,
classrooms,  school  furniture  and  the  supply  of  books.  It  soon  emerged  that  the
implementation of  the programme had been done without adequate planning (Taiwo
1980). Dwindling revenues due to the fall in petroleum prices in the early 1980s meant a
decline in the state financing of education. Debt relief and the Structural Adjustment
Programmes (SAPs) that followed the post-oil-boom years in oil-exporting countries had
the consequence of undermining the credibility of the state and ruling elite in these
countries as was reflected in their inability to deliver on previously established levels of
social  services  that  constituted the social  compact  with their  subjects  (Lubeck 1999).
Reduced  state  financing  of  education  in  Nigeria  meant  that  parents  had  to  bear  a
substantial burden of the financing of their children’s education, even at a level (primary
education)  that  the state  promised would be  free.  In  2003 when the Universal  Basic
Education  Commission  (UBEC)  carried  out  a  national  assessment  of  learning
achievements  in  Nigeria’s  public  schools,  80%  of  the  schools  lacked  basic  school
infrastructure  (adequate  classrooms,  school  furniture,  and  chalkboards),  while  60%
lacked curriculum modules and textbooks (Adekola 2007). The failed implementation of
the UPE has affected the delivery of public education in Nigeria in ways it is yet to recover
from. But more importantly within the context of this discussion, it has damaged public
confidence  in  state-sponsored  education  and  the  credibility  of  formal  institutions
established for its delivery. 
13 The cumulative effect of the neglect of public schools was a decline in the performance of
pupils in basic literacy and numeracy skills as measured in two assessments of Primary
Four pupils in Nigeria’s public schools in 1997 and 2003. The mean scores for literacy were
25 and 35 for 1996 and 1997 respectively, while the mean scores for numeracy were 32
and 34 for the same period (Adekola 2007). For parents, a clear measure of quality was
whether their children can read, write and perform the basic mathematical operations
that were assessed on in the learning achievements reported above. Faced with rather
grim prospects for their children’s education, parents (Muslims or non-Muslim) are most
likely to look for alternative ways of educating their children. The prevalence of private
schools and the increase in their patronage by large sections of Nigerian society from the
mid-1980s onwards (Umar 2003) attest to growing dissatisfaction with the delivery of
public  education.  The  irony  in  the  Nigerian  elite  enrolling  their  children  in  private
schools even when they have statutory responsibilities to oversee the provision of public
education is  keenly debated in contemporary Nigerian media.  Studies by both USAID
(2003a) and Abd-el-Khalik, Boyle & Pier (2006) suggest that the motivation of parents in
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enrolling their children in Islamic schools is not entirely religious; they have concerns
over quality as well. The point here is to establish the poor delivery of public education in
Nigeria as the driving force behind the different manifestations of Islamic schools in the
education arena. Although they have been effectively sidelined in the implementation of
the state’s development agenda in education, Islamic schools have regained relevance
following the failure of these developmental policies. Another point that has also been
made is the inability of the state to seize the initiative by providing a common framework
that would guide the future direction of Islamic schools and establish credible points of
contact  between these  schools  and the  state-driven education agenda.  This  situation
leaves the ulama in charge of the dominant discourse as far as the participation of Islamic
schools in educational development is concerned. 
 
Filling the Gaps: The Nigerian Ulama in the Education
Arena 
14 The gradual deterioration of Nigeria’s public education system made it easy for the Ulama
and their schools to regain relevance as credible alternatives to the failed policies of the
Nigerian sate.  Debiel  & Lambach (2010) maintain that in a situation of crisis  of  state
failure, local elites have a way of positioning themselves as ‘functional equivalents’ by
serving as hybrid providers of those public goods that the state does not provide or only
provides poorly. They do so by capitalising on some aspects of the state-building agenda
to advance their political and economic interests. The model that the ulama in Northern
Nigeria capitalised on to register a significant presence in the country’s education arena
was an institution called the Northern Provinces Law School (NPLS). NPLS was established
by the British colonial authority in 1934 to train judges to administer Islamic law in its
territories (Umar 2003). Although the school underwent changes in its name, structure
and curricula in subsequent years,  the possibility it  provided of  a  synthesis  between
western education and Islamic education was not lost on the Ulama. The pioneering work
of Muslim organisations had already established similar models at the primary and post-
primary levels among the Yoruba Muslims of South-West Nigeria (Taiwo 1980; Ibrahim
2005). However, even before the Ulama became actively involved, state governments in
Northern Nigeria had capitalized on the initiative to establish colleges that offered a
combination of  western and Islamic education for the training of  Arabic teachers,  as
mentioned earlier. According to Umar (2003), these colleges had become established in
the Northern Nigerian cities of Sokoto, Gombe, Maiduguri, Hadejia and Kano by 1979. 
15 By the late 1980s when concerns over the quality of public schools became widespread,
the  penetration  of  the  Ulama in  the  delivery  mechanisms  of  public  education  had,
therefore,  produced  two  tracks  of  Islamic  schools  that  became  popular,  particularly
among urban Muslims in  Northern Nigeria.  The two types  that  emerged were  those
operating the madrassa curriculum and those providing the modified national curricula of
public schools (Umar 2003). In addition to incorporating elements of western education in
their programmes, both also adopted modern organisational and management styles of
public  schools.  However,  they differ  from the  latter  in  their  conscious  projection of
distinct Islamic cultural identity and orientation in the physical outlay of the school,
dress  and discipline.  Umar reasons that  it  is  the emphasis  they place on Arabic and
Islamic studies in their curricula that shapes their Islamic character and differentiates
them from public schools. The two schools are linked to the educational bureaucracy of
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the  Nigerian  state  because  they  operate  under  the  supervision of  an  agency  of
government, the National Board for Arabic and Islamic Studies. 
16 By structuring their  curricula to reflect  the two-tier  structure of  Nigerian secondary
school system,5 Islamic schools operating the modified national curricula facilitate the
integration of their students in educational and career opportunities without abandoning
their pursuit of Islamic education. They have been able to achieve this by broad coverage
of subjects prescribed for secondary schools in the NPE, the use of English as the medium
for  teaching  these  secular  subjects,  and  putting  their  students  forward  for  common
national  examination and certification processes.  Although they face constraints  that
limit  their  internal  efficiencies  (Umar  2003;  Abd-el-Khalik  et  al.  2006),  these  Islamic
schools proceed in a direction that reinforces the attainment by the state of common
policy goals which are critical to the enthronement of national unity. 
17 The madrassa curriculum, on the other hand, offers exposure to a classical Arabic and
Islamic education and provides only limited space for a secular content and the use of
English as an instructional or communicative medium. In his analysis of the curricula
content  of  these  schools,  Tikumah  (2008)  notes  that  out  of  the  12  subjects  on  the
curriculum, 9 focused on the study of Islamic theology, jurisprudence and Arabic. The 4
remaining subjects, apart from carrying less weight on the curricula, are the only subjects
taught in English. English is not only the instructional medium in Nigerian schools from
the fourth year of primary education (Federal Republic of Nigeria, FRN 2004) but is also
the lingua franca for a diverse population with over 250 languages. As far as linkages with
public  education  are  concerned,  the  use of  Arabic  as  an  instructional  medium  in
madrassas restricts  contact  with  the  broad  curricula  on  offer  by  Nigeria’s  higher
institutions of learning. While madrassas provide their students with formal qualifications
that allow access to higher education, their presence is largely felt in Arabic, Islamic legal
studies,  and  Islamic  studies  courses.  The  latest  addition  to  this  list  is  the  Nigeria
Certificate in Education (NCE)6 Arabic Medium programme that has been designed to
enable products of madrassas to obtain nationally approved professional teacher training
for  the  teaching  of  Arabic  and Islamic  studies.  The NCE Arabic  Medium programme
substitutes  English  with  Arabic  as  an  instructional medium for  the  teaching of  core
professional  teacher education courses that  form part  of  the NCE programme run in
Colleges of Education (COEs) in Nigeria. This is in addition to their study of Arabic and
Islamic  studies  as  teaching  subjects  using  the  same  medium  of  instruction.  General
Studies and General English (collectively called GSE courses) are the only components of
the  NCE  Arabic-medium programme  that  are  taught  in  English.  Therefore,  although
madrassas may be said to have modernised the contents and delivery practices of the old
Islamic schools from the pre-colonial era, they have only limited engagement with the
national  curricula  or  instructional  medium,  particularly  at  the  secondary  and  post-
secondary school levels. This limitation also reflects in the overall integration of madrassa
students in the national discourse and action in the political, economic or social spheres. 
18 While the two tracks of Islamic education described above can be considered as off-shoots
of Ulama’s engagement with western education and the Nigerian public-school system,
there is also a third track, which can better be described as the  product of a ‘fallout’ of
some ulama with forces of modernity. These are the Traditional Qur’anic Schools (TQS).
Their  characterisation  as  ‘traditional’  is  not  to  suggest  that  they  are  indigenous  to
communities in Nigeria but is used to describe their retention of many of their prototype
features since being introduced in Northern Nigeria in the 14th century. The primary
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function of Qur’anic schools is to contribute to the early upbringing of Muslim children
by training them in the reading and memorisation of the Qur’an. In performing these
functions, Qur’anic schools laid the foundation for the emergence of an Islamic system of
education long before the advent of western education in Northern Nigeria (Clarke 1982).
Known in Hausa as Makarantar Allo, Qur’anic school is the first of the two phases that
Islamic  education typically  consists  of;  the  other  being Makarantar  Ilmi  or  school  for
advanced learning. While Qur’anic schools provide the equivalent of modern pre-primary
and primary education,  Makarantar  ilmi is  a  long educational  experience designed to
provide students of Qur’anic schools with an understanding of the meaning of the Quran
and exposure to other specialised branches of Islamic learning (Fafunwa 1991). Although
many of the Islamic schools described above had humble beginnings as Qur’anic schools,
the expansion they have witnessed has been concentrated at the advanced level of Islamic
learning. In other words, the lower level of Qur’anic schooling has not witnessed the same
degree of modernisation and reform as the advanced level. 
19 Unlike the Ulama of the two school types above that are willing to engage with the state
and  forces  of  modernity,  Qur’anic  school  proprietors/teachers  (malammai in  Hausa)
prefer to preserve what they perceive as the pristine purity of Islam from contamination
by  the  forces  of  modernity  symbolised  by  the  state.  The  influence  of  Christian
missionaries in the introduction and propagation of western education in Nigeria helped
to reinforce the uncompromising stance of these ulama on contact with or coexistence
between  Islamic  education  and  western  education.  Consequently,  these  schools
maintained a tradition of exclusive focus on Qur’anic reading and memorisation as the
content of study. While the search for an alternative to a discredited public school system
led the modernist ulama and their urban elite followers to the new Islamic schools and
madrassas described above,  poverty and limited access  to these schools  have left  the
urban  poor  and  the  rural  Muslim populace  with  no  option  but  Traditional  Qur’anic
Schools (TQS) to educate their children. Therefore, by the late 1990s, Qur’anic schools
commanded  more  pupil  enrolments  than  formal  primary  schools  in  many  Northern
Nigerian states (USAID 2003b).  Given the persistent low primary-school  enrolment in
states with high incidences of Qur’anic schools reported earlier, there is little reason to
believe that the situation has changed in recent times. 
20 Like all  other Islamic schools,  TQS have suffered from neglect by the state.  However,
these schools have suffered even more because they lack the internal dynamism to push
for change from within, as was the case with the more advanced Islamic schools described
above. They have also had a long history of aversion to externally induced change. It is
this  contradictory  reality  of  the  TQS  that  informed  the  floating  of  an  integration
programme for the TQS by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN). The thrust of the
programme is to integrate the content from formal school curricula into the programmes
of  these  schools  without  interfering with their  traditional  mandate  or  altering their
management  or  control  structures  (FGN  1999).  The  FGN  hopes  that  through  this
programme of reforms, Qur’anic schools will be better empowered for integration into
the UBE programme as delivery mechanisms for basic education to a number of children
who have been deprived and isolated. However, after about 5 years of implementation,
the  FGN  has  conceded  that  the  programme  is  characterised  by  many  gaps  in
implementation. These include a lack of engagement with critical stakeholders (the ulama
), inadequate supervision and linkages with state educational bureaucracy, poor delivery
of  instructional  facilities/materials,  and  insensitivity  to  the  needs  of  the  intended
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beneficiaries  of  the  programme  (Federal  Ministry  of  Education,  FME  2005).  The
implementation  of  this  programme  is  unfolding  and  a  comprehensive  review  of  its
progress is yet to be made but if experiences in the formal education sector are anything
to  go  by,  implementation  infidelity  on  the  part  of  the  state  usually  creates  an
ambivalence that local elite (in this case the ulama) capitalise on to promote their own
interests. This is particularly the case since local power holders are not employees of the
state and are not beholden to it. Instead the state is often seen as an intruder that has to
be kept at a distance or eventually bypassed (Debiel & Lambach 2010).
 
Implications for Educational Development in Northern
Nigeria 
21 One of the development challenges Nigeria faces in contemporary times is how to harness
its  many  diversities  into  potential  strengths.  These  ethnic,  linguistic  and  religious
diversities  are  a  constant  source  of  tension  in  the  political,  social  and  economic
relationships  between its  constituent  parts.  With a  population of  almost  150  million
people  roughly  divided  between  Muslims  and  Christians,  religion  often  reinforces
regional and ethnic divisions. This heightens communal competition for the country’s
rich but hopelessly mismanaged human and natural resources. Regional disparities are
further compounded by a wide educational imbalance between the largely Muslim north
and the predominantly Christian south. These gaps often lead to claims of inequity in the
distribution of opportunities requiring formal qualifications.  Since the first decade of
independence, the country’s ruling elite hoped that the expansion of equal educational
opportunities would form the basis for national cohesion. Public education, it was hoped,
would achieve this by providing a common language and cultural experience and shared
values to a new generation of Nigerians whose future decisions would affect the country’s
destiny (Abernethy 1969). Although the country has since had its NPE and two national
programmes of  universal  access  to  education (UPE & UBE),  the  role  of  education in
national cohesion is beset with many challenges. 
22 Among the challenges of educational delivery, particularly in Northern Nigeria, are the
conflicting roles of different varieties of Islamic schools, an Ulama class that does not
necessarily share in the national ideals and a state bureaucracy that is not committed to
the their pursuit. A section of the ulama and the schools they control has demonstrated a
willingness to engage with the state and modern infrastructure of educational delivery in
order  to  advance  their  participation  in  education.  With  this  strategy,  they  have
effectively  increased  their  relevance  as  legitimate  institutions  for  furthering  the
developmental goals of the Nigerian state. In practical terms, they have widened access to
educational  opportunities  and the  accruing  mobility  prospects  to  a  large  number  of
Muslim  youth  (including  women)  in  a  culturally  sensitive  setting.  However,  by
positioning themselves as ‘functional equivalents’ to the state in the provision of vital
social services such as education, these modernist ulama are also seeking to enthrone
Islamic  values  into  the  largely  secular,  western-oriented bureaucracy and knowledge
structure of Nigeria’s public schools (Umar 2001). In this context, the failure of the state
to  fulfil  its  development  and  welfare  rhetoric  (what  Nigerians  call  ‘dividends  of
democracy’) is often projected as evidence of the sterility of western ideas, thoughts and
practices.  Islamism,  as  the  doctrine  of  the  modernist  Ulama is  called,  represents  an
alternative political discourse that challenges western hegemony even as it engages with
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its  global  infrastructure,  strategies  and  institutions  (Lubeck  1999).  The  new  Islamic
schools of the modernist ulama are therefore producing a young cadre of Muslim men and
women who are not only capable of engaging in the dominant national discourse but also
of redirecting it in line with their religious values and teachings. 
23 While some Ulama seek engagement with the state and its modern structures,  others
prefer to maintain a distance in the hope that doing so will  help them preserve the
teachings and ideals of Islam.  By operating exclusively religious schools that are neither
recognised by nor linked to state educational bureaucracy, these ulama isolate the large
number of school-age children they enrol from the modern infrastructure of polity and
economy. Therefore, the large numbers of pupils reportedly ‘out of school’ are enrolled in
these TQS. Since neither the state nor communities provide for the welfare needs of these
children, they suffer social dislocation and economic deprivation. Growing into an adult
life of exclusion and limited opportunities, products of these schools have in recent times
been associated with socio-religious upheavals executed under the spiritual direction of
some members of the Ulama. These traditional religious schools have also provided the
intellectual and recruitment base for what Danfulani (2009) refers to as ‘syncretistic and
anti-establishment’ Islamic movements. These movements blend Hausa folk beliefs and
practices with selected parts of Qur’anic content to justify anti-development practices
such as non-school enrolment, the rejection of immunisation programmes, and the denial
of women’s and children’s rights. The latest manifestations of these movements are the
Boko-Haram7 and Kala  Kato8 upheavals  that  affected some northern states  in July  and
December 2009 respectively. 
 
Conclusion 
24 Religious elites have significant contributions to make in the conception and execution of
development programmes in developing countries like Nigeria. The Nigerian government
acknowledges the enormity of the task of universal access to good quality education at
the basic level, and knows that its execution would have to be in partnership with all
levels of civil society. But beyond this polity rhetoric, it has not put in place mechanisms
to mobilise and engage the potential contributions of communities and groups in the task
of  educational  development.  In  particular,  the  government  has  displayed  a  pathetic
inability  to  constructively  engage  with  and regulate  the  participation  of  the  Islamic
religious elite and groups in the provision of education. On the contrary, a growing sense
of isolation in Islamic schools has enabled the religious elite to consolidate their control
over curricula content and management structures in these schools in worrying ways.
This  paper has explored the various dimensions of  the ulama’s engagement with the
Nigerian state in the provision of education and their possible impact on educational
development in Northern Nigeria and the pursuit of national unity.   
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NOTES
1.  ‘Ulama’ is the Arabic word for Islamic scholars (plural).  The Hausa equivalent is malammai
(plural) or malam (singular). The ulama establishment among the Hausa people is strongly male-
dominated.
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2.  This  paper  is  part  of  an  ongoing  research  work  for  a  PhD  in  Curriculum  Theory  at  the
University  of  Jos,  Nigeria  being  undertaken by  the  author  with  a  fellowship  grant  from the
American Council of Learned Societies, ACLS, New York.
3.  I thank Dr. Ibrahim Hassan (Dept. of Religious Studies, University of Jos, Nigeria) for making
available to me data he collected for an ACLS-sponsored study on “The Thoughts of the Fodio’s
on Development”.  
4.  Prior  to  1967,  the  Northern Region exercised administrative  control  over  all  of  northern
Nigeria. The number of semi-autonomous administrative units or states has risen from 12 in 1967
to 36 today.  
5.  Nigeria operates a 6-3-3-4 system of education: 6 years of primary education, 3 years of Junior
Secondary School (JSS), 3 years of Senior Secondary Schools (SSS), and 4 years of University (or
other types of tertiary) education. However, with the provisions of the UBE Act of 2004, the 6
years  of  primary  education  and the  3  years  of  JSS  constitute  9  years  of  free,  universal  and
compulsory basic education. 
6.  NCE is the official minimum teaching qualification in Nigeria.
7. Boko-Haram, a Hausa expression meaning ‘western education is sinful’, was the name given to a
religious group led by an Islamic cleric, Mohammed Yusuf, that sought the forceful imposition of
Shariah Islamic Law and a dismantling of state structures across some Northern Nigerian states
(Bauchi, Borno & Kano).
8. Kala Kato is  a Hausa expression describing religious teachings propagated by some Islamic
clerics or groups that lack any legitimacy from divine sources of Islam (the Quran, or Hadith,
recorded the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad). 
ABSTRACTS
Islamic  schools  in  Nigeria  have  undergone  transformations  from  a position  of  monopolistic
control over spiritual knowledge to one of competition and subsequently struggle for survival as
they encountered missionary and colonial incursions. The post-colonial state that emerged had
to  endure  weakened  Islamic  schools  which  nonetheless  retained  legitimacy  in  the  eyes  of
observant  Muslims  as  culturally  and  religiously  valued  institutions.  This  paper  describes  a
fluctuating  pattern  of  mutual  isolation,  engagement  and  competition  that  characterise  the
relationship between the state, Islamic schools and an influential corps of Islamic clerics (Ulama)
operating outside the spheres of state bureaucracy. Northern Nigeria, where these schools are
prevalent,  has  endured  a  long  list  of  developmental  challenges  including  a  low  level  of
educational attainment which places it  at a competitive disadvantage in its relationship with
Southern Nigeria.  The paper claims that although both the state and a section of the Ulama
realise that a reform of Islamic schools is vital to the development of Northern Nigeria, a long
period of mutual isolation and the weak position of Nigeria’s educational bureaucracy have made
the  finding  of  a  common  operational  framework  difficult.  A  strong  state-driven  education
delivery mechanism is what Nigeria needs to control the unregulated growth of different brands
of Islamic schools from compounding its many developmental challenges. 
Les écoles islamiques au Nigeria ont subi des transformations allant d’une position de contrôle
monopolistique sur le savoir spirituel à une position de compétition, puis de lutte pour la survie
face aux incursions missionnaires et coloniales. Par la suite l’État postcolonial émergeant s’est
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confronté à des écoles islamiques affaiblies mais conservant toutefois une certaine légitimité. Cet
article montre que les relations entre État, écoles islamiques et ulamas opérant en dehors de la
bureaucratie, fluctuent entre engagement, compétition et distanciation mutuelle. Au Nigeria du
Nord, où ces écoles sont dominantes et où les défis pour le développement sont nombreux, le
niveau d’instruction reste bas, ce qui  place cette région en situation de  relative faiblesse vis-à-
vis  du Nigeria  du Sud.  L’article  met  en évidence qu’en dépit  de  leur  volonté  de  réformer le
système éducatif islamique l’État et les Ulamas peinent à trouver un cadre de travail commun.
L’État nigérian parvient difficilement à contrôler la croissance irrégulée des écoles islamiques.   
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